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The Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
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Jacob E. Gersen**

Abstract
There are more than 500,000 elected officials in the United States, 96 percent of whom
serve in local governments. Electoral density—the number of elected officials per capita
or per governmental unit—varies greatly from place to place. The most electorally dense
county has more than 20 times the average number of elected officials per capita. In this
paper, we offer the first systematic investigation of the link between electoral density and
fiscal policy. Drawing on principal-agent theories of representation, we argue that
electoral density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs.
Increasing the number of specialized elected offices promotes issue unbundling, reducing
slack between citizen preferences and government policy; but the costs of monitoring a
larger number of officials may offset these benefits, producing greater latitude for
politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen interests. Thus, we predict
diminishing returns to electoral density, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between the
number of local officials and government fidelity to citizen preferences. Using a countylevel dataset of all elected officials in the United States, we evaluate this theory along
with competing theories from the existing literature. Empirically, we find evidence that
public sector size decreases with electoral density up to a point, beyond which budgets
grow as more officials are added within a community.
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INTRODUCTION
The ability of citizens in the United States to select their governing officials varies
enormously from place to place. For instance, Lake County, Illinois is governed by 1,125
local officeholders, whereas the similarly populated Mecklenburg County, North
Carolina has only 67 elected officials. This paper explores how variation in the structure
of local electoral institutions exacerbates or mitigates agency problems between voters
and elected officials in local fiscal behavior. Specifically, we model the taxing and
spending of local governments as a function of the number and nature of elected officials
within a jurisdiction. Our central claim is that the addition of elected officials often
unbundles policy issues so as to produce greater voter control over all elected officials.
However, because monitoring elected officials entails costs, having too many elected
officials in a jurisdiction can sometimes worsen agency problems and produce greater
slack in the voter-politician relationship. We suggest this dynamic produces a U-shaped
relationship between the number of elected officials in an area and fidelity to voter
preferences, for our purposes preferences over taxing and spending.
Our theory and data capture essential elements of the relationship between
electoral institutions and public policy not previously emphasized or analyzed. For
example, the existing literature contains conflicting views of the relationship between the
size or structure of government and the level of taxing and spending. Different theoretical
and empirical camps insist the relationship is positive, negative, or nonexistent. In part,
we suggest this disagreement results from a lack of precision or nuance about the
different types of elected officials.
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Electoral institutions come in many shapes and sizes. There are more than
500,000 elected officials in the United States, or roughly one representative for every 600
inhabitants. The vast majority of these elected officials—96 percent—are in local
governments. In addition to electing members of local governing bodies, such as city
councils, county commissions, and school boards, voters choose myriad officials in the
local executive and judicial branches, including mayors, judges, sheriffs, and treasurers,
to name only a few. This paper models fiscal policy-making in local government as a
function of the number and type of elected officials. We argue that the results have broad
implications for the practice of democracy at all levels of government.

I. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
In textbook theories of democracy, elections ensure that policy outcomes are a
rough match to majoritarian or median voter preferences (Dahl 1989; Sen 1983). Yet, this
idealized view of elections as translating popular preferences into public policy has longsine faltered, and it has done so for many reasons discussed extensively in the literature
(Gailmard and Jenkins 2006). Voters may be ignorant or have worse information than
legislators (Downs 1957, Arnold 1993). The whole notion of popular will might be either
incoherent or nonexistent (Campbell et al. 1960, Riker 1981, Zaller 1992). And public
choice theory in general provides no shortage of reasons to be dubious of the political
process, including elections (Mueller 2003).
Perhaps most important, the voter-legislator relationship is riddled with agency
problems (Lupia and McCubbins (1998:79)), and we therefore adopt the standard
principal-agent framework. The agenda control exercised by elected officials may allow
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legislators to enact policy that systematically diverges from voter preferences (Romer and
Rosenthal 1982). So long as representatives propose a new policy that is far from voter
preferences but less far than the status quo ante (existing policy), voters may not be able
to sanction representatives effectively. Alternatively, because representatives will often
have or develop expertise that voters lack, legislators will have a significant degree of
discretion as well (Gailmard and Jenkins 2006). If voter information is worse than
legislator information, voters will often not be able to tell whether a policy that diverges
from their own preferences diverges for good reasons (legislator expertise) or bad reasons
(divergent legislative preferences or self-interest).
Once the voter-politician relationship is located in the principal-agent framework,
the role of elections in democracy becomes somewhat clearer. Elections are simply a
mechanism for managing agency problems, and the efficacy of elections as a mechanism
for controlling officials will vary with different institutional arrangements and political
conditions. Elections provide a mechanism for voters both to select representatives that
will take desirable actions (Fearon 1999), and sanction legislators who fail to enact policy
consistent with voter preferences (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Banks and Sundaram
1998, 1993).
If so, then the risk of drift between voters and policy outcomes is real, but the
extent of slack depends on the nature and specific structure of the principal-agent
relationship in any given jurisdiction. As a simple example, elections might be more or
less frequent. More frequent elections should provide greater control over elected
officials, but also impose greater participation costs on voters. An official elected to, say,
a twenty-year term might be able to ignore the will of voters for long stretches of time.
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An official facing reelection each month would need to be more vigilant in pleasing
voters, but at the same time voters would need to expend more effort on electoral
participation.
To understand the impact of electoral institutions on policy outcomes, then, it is
critical to distinguish those institutions that reduce slack in the voter-official relationship
and those that do not. A promising recent perspective on this question is the idea of issue
unbundling posited in a pair of recent papers by Besley and Coate (2000, 2003). The
basic idea is as follows. Suppose in a given jurisdiction there are j policy dimensions. On
any given dimension, the government can choose either a special interest-friendly policy
or a voter-friendly policy. A majority of voters prefers the voter-friendly policy on each
dimension. However, there is an interest group in each domain that prefers the specialinterest policy, and the group will provide a private benefit to the policymaker if the
special interest’s preferred policy is enacted. This benefit may be a campaign
contribution that the policymaker can use to improve her lot at election time or a bribe
that can be used for private consumption. The policymaker would like to receive the side
payments from the interest groups, but only if doing so will not cost her the next election.
Consider a jurisdiction in which a single elected official has responsibility for all j
policy dimensions. This official will be ascribed all the blame and credit for policy
outcomes, and voters must make a single reelect-reject decision in each election. The
crudeness of the electoral sanction reduces voters’ ability to control the single official
along any particular policy dimension. In a sense, voters must make a decision on a
bundle of policy dimensions. As a result, the official may be able enact special interestfriendly policies in some dimensions, as long as she enacts consumer-friendly policies on
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a sufficient number of dimensions to secure reelection. For these “general purpose”
officials, elections will not completely mitigate agency problems.
In contrast with the general-purpose policymaker, consider a jurisdiction in which
a separate elected official makes policy in each of the j issue domains. The creation of
specialized offices for particular policies facilitates issue unbundling. When an official is
exclusively responsible for providing a single public good like water or sanitation, voters
do not have to make aggregate judgments across multiple policy issues when evaluating
that official. A vote for or against the “special purpose” official is a summary of voter
preferences along only one policy dimension. An official who enacts an interest groupfriendly policy in her single domain will not be able to placate voters with voter-friendly
policies on other issues. Thus, for those issue dimensions in which there is a specialized
official, elections should better ensure that policy outcomes are close to the preferences
of voters. The greater the unbundling, the greater the mitigation of agency problems. In a
jurisdiction with j elected officials, each of whom has authority to make decisions along a
single policy dimension, the power of elections increases drastically. Besley and Coate
(2003) provide empirical support for their issue unbundling argument by contrasting
elected and appointed utility regulators. Using panel data for US states, they find that
elected regulators systematically enact more consumer-friendly policies than appointed
regulators.
The logic of issue unbundling for elected versus appointed offices has been
developed in the context of a single office. But is there any theoretical limit to the
unbundling benefits that can be achieved by converting more and more offices from
appointed to elected positions? If issue unbundling gives citizens the opportunity to bring

5

Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
policy outcomes closer to their preferences, should not all public positions, from district
attorney to dog catcher, be elected offices with authority over a single policy dimension?
We believe the answer is no, and the reason lies with the increased monitoring costs
associated with the proliferation of elected offices. Each additional elected office added
to the ballot requires additional work on the part of voters. As the number of offices
grows, the costs to citizens of monitoring a legion of public officials may outweigh any
marginal benefits associated with issue unbundling.
We conceive of electoral monitoring costs as having two basic components. The
first component is a function of the number of public services provided in the
jurisdiction. At the most basic level, the citizen must determine whether each policy has
been set at the voter-friendly level or the interest-group friendly level. The second
component of monitoring costs is a function of the number of elected offices. For each
office, the citizen must be able to identify the incumbent and assess her responsibility for
a particular service or services. To illustrate, consider the voter’s experience at the polls.
On the ballot, the citizen sees a list of offices, and for each office a list of names. The
ballot does not identify the incumbent, and in most cases it does not even list a political
party affiliation.1 At a minimum, a voter must be able to identify the incumbent for each
office and match the incumbent to an assessment of the service(s) performed by the office
in question. Where there is only one general purpose office, all services can be attributed
to one official. The voter needs only to know which candidate is the incumbent and to
form an overall assessment of the incumbent’s performance. Where there are many
offices, the task becomes considerably more challenging. In practice, it is not at all
unusual to find two dozen or more elected offices on a ballot. In the discussion that
1

About three-quarters of local elections are nonpartisan.
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follows, we use the term monitoring costs to refer to total effort required to evaluate all
services in a jurisdiction and match them to the relevant incumbent officials.
The addition of monitoring costs to the unbundling framework suggests that the
relationship between the number of elected offices and policy outcomes may not be linear
or even monotonic. Rather, the addition of elected officials may lead to more voterfriendly policies up to a point because the marginal benefits of unbundling are greater
than the marginal costs of monitoring. However, as more and more elected officials are
added, marginal monitoring costs may exceed marginal unbundling benefits. That is, as
monitoring costs increase, each elected official may receive less scrutiny from voters. If
so, then officials governing specialized domains may be able to adopt special interestfriendly policies without suffering electoral reprisals. If marginal unbundling benefits
decrease with the number of officials and marginal monitoring costs increase, then the
overall relationship between the number of officials and policy outcomes should exhibit
diminishing returns. At some point, marginal monitoring costs may outweigh marginal
unbundling benefits, in which case we should find a U-shaped relationship between the
number of elected officials and the prevalence of voter-friendly policy outcomes.
In the remainder of the paper, we explore these ideas in the context of local fiscal
policy. To test our theory, we analyze the fiscal behavior of local governments as a
function of the number of elected offices within the jurisdiction. Our assumption is that
special interest-friendly policies entail greater government spending than voter-friendly
policies. In other words, most interest groups want more government spending on the
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policy they care about rather than less.2 Therefore, we model government spending as a
quadratic function of electoral density and expect the main effect to be negative and the
squared term to carry a positive sign. We also model the relationship semi-parametrically.
Whether actual values of electoral density are set at levels where the marginal costs of
monitoring exceed the marginal benefits of unbundling—that is, whether the actual
reduced form relationship is U-shaped—is an empirical question, which we return to after
a brief literature review.

II. RELATED LITERATURE
Although the relationship between the number of elected offices and fiscal policy
has not been studied, other literatures have explored the impact of size of government on
spending. For example, a robust literature predicts that legislative bodies with more
members will tend to overspend. Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnson (1981) showed that in a
legislature with a norm of universalism, districted elections, and general taxation
authority, budget project scale increases as the number of districts and therefore
legislators grows. Because the benefits of pork-like spending projects tend to be
concentrated in one district and the costs of paying (taxes) spread diffusely across all
districts, the legislative body will exhibit an overspending bias. This class of models
essentially treats the tax base as a common pool resource, producing standard problems
of over-extraction. Given the assumptions of the model, increasing the number of elected
officials in a jurisdiction produces an overspending bias—a gap between voter
preferences and legislative outcomes. This effect has come to be known as the “law of
2

While there are certain taxpayers groups that promote smaller government overall, we are aware of
relatively few groups that fight for lower provision of services in particular policy areas such as education
or policing.
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1/n,” which summarizes the share of tax costs internalized by any single district as the
legislature grows. Although the assumption of “universality” has been criticized in the
literature, at base it is merely an assumption of logrolling (Weingast and Marshall 1988),
hardly an implausible working assumption for legislative behavior.
The Shepsle, Weingast, and Johnson model was developed in the context of the
U.S. Congress, but its empirical support has come primarily from studies of other
legislative bodies.3 In particular, Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) show that state level
expenditures are positively related to the number of seats in a state legislature. Their
findings support the hypothesis that increasing the number of elected officials leads to
more spending than citizens would like. At the local level, Baqir (2002) finds that
jurisdictions with more city council districts (more elected officials on the city council)
spend more. Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher (1996) also find that per capita
expenditures are positively related to the number of elected members of the city council
(in a sample of cities with a council-manager form of government and a weak mayor).
Similarly, Dalenberg and Duffy Deno (1991) argue that cities with ward elections tend to
spend more than cities with at-large election systems, which they link to the problem of
concentrated benefits and diffuse costs that underlies the law of 1/n.
Other political institutions like direct citizen initiatives or referenda can also
reduce the severity of agency problems. For example, Matsusaka (1995) shows that states
with a direct citizen initiative or referendum have lower spending than states without
these institutions. He argues that initiatives allow voters to reduce the power of agenda
control exercised by legislators in non-initiative states, and also to bring specific

3

Knight (2006) provides a useful review and synthesis of the literature on common-pool problems in
legislatures.
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outcomes back in line with voter preferences in symmetric information settings. More
direct voter control results in less state spending. Similarly, Gerber (1999) finds that
states with the initiative produce social policies that more closely reflect voter
preferences. On the other hand, Farnham (1990) finds only modest effects of recalls,
initiatives, and referenda on local public expenditures, and Besley and Case (2003) find
that inferences about the initiative’s effect on fiscal outcomes are highly sensitive to how
the model’s standard errors are estimated.
It is not inevitable that electoral institutions will determine the relationship
between voters and elected officials. The Tiebout (1965) model and its progeny,4 suggest
that (given certain assumptions) competition between local governments should result in
the optimal provision of public goods. If citizens are mobile, jurisdictions that overextract from their tax base will suffer an exodus of residents and capital. If local
governments compete with each other for an increased tax base, the right bundle of
public goods, taxes, and spending should be provided to each respective populus.5 The
literature on local government competition is expansive, and we wish to make only a
gesture in its direction.6 However, if it is correct, then institutional variation such as the
number of elected officials or the structure of different governmental units should be
largely irrelevant for determining fiscal outcomes. Neither the number of officials nor the
structure of local government should be systematically associated with government
taxation, spending, or borrowing in a perfectly competitive local government “market.”

4

See generally Sprunger and Wilson (1998); Taylor (1995); Sonstelie and Portney (1978); Rose-Ackerman
(1983a; 1983b); Rauscher (1998); Perroni and Scharf (2001).
5
But see, e.g., Epple and Zelenitz (1981) for an argument that Tiebout competition alone is insufficient to
constrain government excesses.
6
Wilson (1999) provides an excellent review of the literature on tax competition.
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A prediction that electoral institutions will be largely irrelevant to public policy—
fiscal or otherwise—is also supported by an assortment of scholarship relating to the
median voter theorem. In a first-past-the-post winner-take-all political system, legislative
outcomes will simply replicate the preferences of the median voter. (Borcherding and
Deacon 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman 1973).7 If so, then a legislature with 10 members
will produce identical policy outcomes as a legislator of 100 members; both will match
the preferences of the median voter and policy should be invariant to the number of
legislators, votes, or elections.
Together, these various schools of thought produce clear but divergent predictions
about the relationship between elected officials and government fiscal behavior. The
common pool resource overextraction literature predicts that taxing and spending should
increase with the number of legislators. A focus on elections as a mechanism for issue
unbundling suggests a negative relationship, and both the Tiebout competition and
median voter models predict a null effect. Our own framework predicts diminishing
returns and possibly a U-shaped relationship between the number of elected officials and
fiscal behavior.
If the theoretical literature offers competing arguments about the relationship
between the size of governing and fiscal policy, existing empirical studies have done little
to settle the question. The evidence on institutional variation and spending is mixed at the
local level. A common approach is to ask whether cities that reformed their government
structures spend more or less than cities that have not.8 In this vein, some studies
conclude that municipal governments of the council-manager form spend less than

7
8

For an overview of these and related models, see Mueller (2003).
See Jung (2006) for an overview.
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mayor-council municipalities (Booms 1966; Lineberry and Folwoer 1967; Clark 1968;
Stumm and Corrigan 1998). Other studies conclude that reformed municipalities spend
more (Sherbenou 1961; Nunn 1996; Cole 1971; French 2004). Others find a null effect
(Liebert 1974; Lyons and Morgan 1977; Dye and Garcia 1978; Morgan and Pelissaro
1980; Deno and Mehay 1987; Hayes and Chang 1990; Morgan and Watson 1995). While
Baqir (2002) and Langbein, Crewson, and Brasher (1996) find a positive relationship
between the number of seats on a city council and the level of expenditures, no one, so
far as we are aware, has examined the broader question of the relationship between the
number of local elected offices and taxing and spending in local government.
Although these literatures are often discussed together, making sense of the
divergent predictions and findings requires a bit more precision. For example, scholarship
on the law of 1/n is properly focused on legislative bodies like Congress or city councils
with districted rather than at large seats. Cabined by its own terms, the law of 1/n
literature applies not to all elected officials, but merely a subset of elected officials.
Adding districts to a legislature should exacerbate the common-pool problem underlying
the law of 1/n, but adding other nonlegislative elected offices should not. On the other
hand adding specialized elected offices unbundles policy authority, while adding seats in
the legislature does not. In other words, we suggest that two distinct forces are at work
for these two different types of elected offices. It is therefore critical in empirical analysis
to distinguish legislative body elected officials from nonlegislative body elected officials.
Moreover, even an increase in nonlegislative body elected officials does not
inevitably reduce slack between voters and representatives. Increasing the number of
elected officials should only reduce slack to the extent that there is a corresponding
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unbundling effect. To wit, adding special purpose elected officials with exclusive
authority over a single policy domain unbundles. Adding general purpose elected
officials with nonexclusive nonunique responsibilities may or may not. Note, however,
that on the margin, the addition of a special purpose elected official may also reduce the
crudeness of a vote on the general purpose elected official. Before the addition of a new
special purpose elected official, a voter would have to average across n policy dimensions
when voting for a general purpose official. After the addition of an elected official (with
exclusive authority over a single policy dimension), a voter must average across n-1
dimensions when voting for existing general purpose official. Although this increase in
efficacy is unlikely to be large, there should be some positive movement at the margin. If
so, adding special purpose government offices should increase the responsiveness of
government as a whole, not only with respect to the new special purpose government
officials.
To summarize, we conceive of the relationship between voters and politicians as a
standard principal-agent problem. Elections provide more control over elected officials
than would exist without elections. But as a mechanism of control, elections are
imperfect. They are likely to be most effective when a single elected official controls a
single policy dimension. In these settings, policy outcomes should be closer to voter
preferences. However, at a certain point the costs of monitoring many government
officials may outweigh the unbundling benefits, implying that the effect of electoral
institutions is likely to exhibit diminishing returns. If the unbundling and monitoring
costs theory of elections is correct, adding elected offices in a jurisdiction should bring
policy outcomes closer to voter preferences until the costs of monitoring grow too great;
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at that point, adding elected offices should produce policy outcomes that are marginally
further from voter preferences. In the context of fiscal policy, we suggest that that some
unbundling will reduce spending; but, too much elected officials will actually increase it.9
Our empirical strategy is analyze the link between what we informally term
electoral density—the abundance of unbundling elected offices in a jurisdiction—and
fiscal outcomes such as taxing and spending patterns. The main analysis models patterns
of revenue raising by local governments as a function of variation in the number of
elected offices. The data demonstrate that local governments with larger city councils do
tax more (consistent with Baqir 2002), but that the relationship between other elected
officials and taxing is indeed U-shaped. As a secondary test of findings, we pursue
identical analysis, but with local government expenditures (rather than revenues) as the
dependent variable. Throughout the analysis we rely on a mix of standard polynomial
regression models and semi-parametric methods.

III. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Because virtually nothing has been written on the local elected offices that are the
subject of this paper, we begin by offering an overview of the institutional environment
we seek to explore.10 Table 1 contains some basic descriptive statistics about the number
and distribution of elected officials. In 1992 there were over 500,000 elected officials in
the United States in federal, state, and local government. The Federal elected officials are
largely familiar: Senators, Representatives, the President and Vice-President.

9

This intuition might be taken to be an alternative theoretical foundation for local overspending bias,
distinct from the law of 1/n.
10
The discussion is drawn from the 1992 Census of Governments (U.S. Census), the last to collect detailed
data on locally elected officials.
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State government elected officials are a substantially larger class, consisting of
more than 18,000 elected officials. Across states, there is significant variation with
respect to how many officials are elected. For example, Delaware has only 80 elected
state officials, while Pennsylvania has 1,200. Forty percent of all State elected officials
are members of State legislatures. The remainder consists of other elected officials (53
percent) including executive, administrative, and judicial functions; and elected members
of State boards (7 percent) that include a handful of school board members in stateoperated school systems (Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey), as well as soil
conservation district boards in Arizona, Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, and Washington.
The vast majority of elected officials—96 percent—serve in local governments. A
staggering 343,000 elected officials are found on the governing boards of counties,
municipalities, townships, special districts, and school districts. These governing bodies,
such as city councils and school boards, represent legislative branch of local government.
For the purposes of our analysis, we are especially interested in the other 120,000 elected
officials who serve in specialized offices of the local executive and judicial branches. To
get a sense of the non-governing body elected officials category, consider Table 2, which
lists the number of various non-governing body elected positions by the different types of
local government. For example, there are 324 county-executives in the United States, and
11,499 mayors of cities and towns.11 Certain officials are associated exclusively or almost
exclusively with certain levels of government. County-executives are of this sort. So too
coroners and sheriffs, which are always county officials. There are 2,930 elected sheriffs

11

For a useful recent summary of the structures of municipal governments, see DeSantis & Renner (2002).
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(county) in the United States and 1,466 elected coroners. Road or Highway
Commissioners are never county elected offices; surveyors always are.12
The tremendous variation in the number of elected offices from place to place is
indicated in Table 3. We begin by created county-area summaries of the total number of
elected offices in all governments. Cook County, Illinois, with a sum total of 370 total
elected offices in all of its local governments, leads the nation. We then compute our two
primary measures of electoral density: the number of elected offices per capita and per
general-purpose government. The average county area has 1.7 elected offices per 1000
capita and 4.4 elected offices per government. At the low end, there are six counties
where no local government has a non-governing body office, and these counties register a
zero for both measures of electoral density. At the high end, Slope, North Dakota, has 75
elected offices per 1000 capita, meaning that nearly 10 percent of the population serves in
a local office!
In sum, there is remarkable variation with respect to the size and structure of
government in the United States. We are certainly not the first to make this observation,
nor the first to analyze local government data. To our knowledge, however, no one has
analyzed the impact of the number of elected offices on fiscal outcomes. The theoretical
discussion emphasizes the critical, but ambiguous role of electoral institutions in the
democratic political structure.

Note that Table 2 is a summary only of elected offices. It says nothing about the number or distribution
of appointed offices with the same functions. For certain offices that all governments at a given level must
have, it is possible to infer the number of appointed officials. For example, if all counties had coroners, we
could calculate the number of appointed-coroner officials by simple subtraction. As a general matter this
will not be possible because not all counties, municipalities, or towns have identical slates of offices.
However, even if precise figures cannot be obtained, the final column in Table 2 is a rough indicator for the
prevalence of electing a given office. For example, only 317 counties elected county-executives while
1,177 elect a probate judge.

12
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IV. DATA & METHODS
Because the functional responsibilities of different types of local governments
varies across states, we use county aggregates as our unit of analysis.13 This allows us to
ensure—to the greatest extent possible—that our local government units provide a similar
bundle of public services. In some counties a given service will be provided by a special
purpose government; in other counties, the same service will be provided by a general
purpose government. However, at the level of county aggregates, we can be reasonably
confident that a similar bundle of services is provided.
We begin by summing the number of elected offices in all governments within a
county.14 The number of elected offices is then normalized by the number of
governments and also by county population to produce two explanatory variables of
interest: elected offices per capita and elected offices per government. The elected offices
variable is computed by summing the number of total elected offices in the county,
excluding officials on governing bodies such as city or county councils. In other words,
this variable captures all of the offices listed in Table 2. Each office is counted only once,
regardless of the number officeholders. For instance, if there are 10 elected judges in a
county, we consider this one elected office. We then divide the number of elected offices
by the total number of general purpose governments within the county to calculate the per
government measure. The elected offices per government variable is a rough measure of

In states that do not officially have county governments, we use the county area, as designated by the
Census of Governments.
14
The number of elected offices is sometimes different than the number of elected officials. The difference
between the two is mainly that some elected offices are occupied by multiple officials. The offices of judge
and constable are common examples.
13
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the degree of unbundling within a county.15 The more functional elected offices within a
county, the greater the degree of unbundling. Similarly, the greater the number of offices,
the greater the total costs of monitoring. Both measures indicate what we call the
electoral density of a county, and both capture the unbundling and monitoring costs
theories.
To estimate the effect of legislative body elected officials, we calculate the
average council size for general purpose governments within the county. If the law of 1/n
literature is correct, the average city council size should be positively associated with
spending. By disaggregating the elected officials data into legislative body and
nonlegislative body officials, we are able to distinguish two potentially conflicting effects
that could easily confound empirical estimates.
Our first dependent variable is general own-source revenue per capita. The
numerator is the sum of own-source revenue across all governments in a county and the
denominator is county population. Own-source revenue refers to all locally-raised
revenue and excludes intergovernmental transfers. Own-source revenue accounts for 58%
of all local government general revenue.16 In addition, we model direct general
expenditures per capita and a sample of expenditures on specific budget line items.
Electoral institutions are obviously not the only or even the primary determinants
of local fiscal patterns. Therefore, we use a set of control variables with a strong
foundation in the prior literature. The first control is income per capita. Following
“Wagner’s Law,” the expectation is that demand for government services increases with
15

We have experimented with other measures as well. Most alternatives have a simple correlation
coefficient in excess of 0.95. No alternative that we have tried produces different conclusions.
16
In principle, the aggregate tax rate is an ideal dependent variable. However, due to variation in
assessment practices across jurisdictions and complexity of tax codes, calculating the effective tax rate in a
county is prohibitively difficult.
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income (Musgrave and Peacock 1958). Next, we control for several population
characteristics that may reflect tastes for public goods (Cutler et al., 1993). We include
the proportion of families with children to control for demand for education, a large
component of local spending. We also include the fraction of the population over 65, as it
is often argued that the older population prefers lower spending on education (Poterba,
1997). On the other hand, there may be additional costs associated with serving an elderly
population. In an effort to control for the ideological orientation of the county, we use the
Republican vote share in the 1992 presidential election. We also control for educational
attainment, as measured by the percentage of adults with a college degree.
Alesina et al. (1999) argue that population heterogeneity leads to increased
pressure for group-specific spending programs but fewer nonexcludable public goods.
While their theoretical model is ambiguous as to the net effects, their empirical results
show a positive association between ethnic heterogeneity and total expenditures and
taxes. Following Alesina et al. (1999), we measure ethnic fragmentation as the
probability that two randomly drawn people from a county belong to different ethnic
groups.17 Income heterogeneity is measured as the ratio of the mean household income to
the median household income in a county. Along these lines, Meltzer and Richard (1981,
1983) argue that increasing inequality causes greater demand for redistribution, hence
higher taxes.

17

Specifically, ethnic fragmentation is computed as follows: Ethnic = 1 −

∑ ( Race )
i

2

,

i

where Racei denotes the share of population identified as of race i and i = {White, Black, Hispanic, Asian
and Pacific Islander, American Indian}. Note that Hispanic is identified as an “origin” rather than a race in
the Census, so I count only non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and American
Indians for those categories. This same measure has been used in numerous prior studies; see the references
in Alesina et al. (1999). For a theoretical interpretation of this index, see Vigdor (2001).
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To address economies of scale considerations, we control for county population
and land area.18 In addition, we include a dummy variable indicating whether a county is
the central county of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and another dummy for
suburban counties within MSAs.19 The omitted category is non-metropolitan counties.
These central and suburban county indicators capture possible sorting by taste, as well as
potential economies of scale in MSAs. Finally, States also vary in their assignment of
fiscal responsibilities to local governments, as well as in unobservable historical, cultural,
and institutional characteristics that may influence fiscal outcomes. For this reason, we
include state fixed effects in all of the models reported below.20
Our main data sources are the 1992 Census of Governments (COG), the 1990
Census of Population and Housing (CPH), and the 1994 City and County Databook
(CCD), all published by the U.S. Census Bureau. The data source for each variable is
specified in Table 3A. We exclude Virginia (134 observations), Hawaii (4 observations),
and Alaska (27 observations) from the analysis. Virginia is the only state whose
municipalities are incorporated as independent cities, which are not part of any county.
Hawaii has the only entirely state-run public school system. Alaska uniquely relies on
boroughs rather than counties, and boroughs do not cover the entire land area of the state.
Anomalously, the COG reports one record for New York City, but no records for its 5
component counties. Not being able to produce a county aggregate record, we drop the
New York City observation.21 In addition, we exclude Shannon county, South Dakota,
18

One concern with this setup is that county population appears as both the denominator of the dependent
variable and on the right hand side of the equation. Therefore, we have also run the analysis excluding
county population. The coefficients change of course, but the substantive conclusions do not.
19
In New England, the Census Bureau specifies central cities and towns rather than central counties of
MSAs. In these states, we define any county containing a central city or town as a central county.
20
The state fixed effects coefficients are not included in the tables, but are available from the authors.
21
Alesina et al. (1999) also discuss this issue, and make the same decision.
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population 10,490, which is the only county that has no elected officials outside the
county governing body. Beginning with a total population of 3,136 counties in the 1992
COG, these case selection criteria produce an analysis sample of 2,965 counties.22 In
addition, for models that measure electoral density as offices per government, we exclude
an additional 37 counties that have no general purpose governments, leaving an analysis
sample of 2,928. Table 3 presents summary statistics for various measures of electoral
density for all counties, while Table 3A presents summary statistics for all the variables
based on the 2,965 counties selected for the analysis.

V. FINDINGS
Our main empirical contribution is to test the unbundling model in more general
institutional settings, looking at all local elected offices, and to estimate the potentially
conflicting effect of the law of 1/n in local government. Our main theoretical contribution
is to extend the unbundling theory of political institutions to include monitoring costs.
This simple revision significantly alters the empirical implications. Rather than
suggesting a negative and largely linear effect of adding elected officials in a jurisdiction,
the monitoring costs revision predicts a quadratic or U-shaped relationship. Spending
should decrease initially as unbundling produces greater control over elected officials and
subsequently increase as the marginal costs swamp any unbundling gain.
To test this proposition, we begin by estimating polynomial regression models of
taxing and spending in local government. Because of the restrictive functional form
assumptions inherent in the polynomial regression context, we also use a semi-parametric
22

There are some minor discrepancies in how counties are counted in the COG versus the CPH, primarily
in Virginia and Alaska, which explain why the former tallies 3,135 counties and the latter 3,034.
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generalized additive model (GAM), in which we estimate the effect of electoral density
with thin plate regression splines and allow all of the other covariates to enter the model
linearly.23 Both methods produce similar results. The relationship appears to be U-shaped
and the turning point is at a reasonable location in the actual data.
An obvious concern with any study of the fiscal effects of political institutions is
endogeneity; namely, the possibility of simultaneous causation between institutional form
and fiscal policy (see Persson and Tabellini 2003). In other words, measures of electoral
density may be correlated with the errors in an OLS regression, leading to biased
estimates. To a large degree, concerns about reverse causation in this case should be
allayed by the fact that electoral institutions are enshrined in longstanding provisions of
state constitutions and city charters. For example, a set of state dummy variables explains
more than half of the variation in electoral density across counties.24 Moreover, the
correlation between county area elected offices per government in 1992 and 1987 is 0.97.
Thus, it is unlikely that electoral institutions change quickly in response to local spending
preferences. In this sense, we believe it is safe to consider electoral institutions as
predetermined, at least in the short-run. However, we return to this issue below.
A. Elected Offices and Revenue
To estimate the effect of electoral institutions on fiscal outcomes, we regress a log
transformed measure of each county’s own source revenues per capita—a standard
measure of taxation in the public finance literature—on measures of elected offices per
unit of government and per capita and their square. This is a straightforward polynomial
23

The seminal reference on GAMs is Hastie and Tibshirani (1990). Beck and Jackman (1998) provide an
accessible introduction. Our implementation follows Wood (2006) and the associated R package, mgcv.
24
A regression of county aggregate elected offices per government on a set of state dummy variables yields
an adjusted R-squared of 0.54, with 2,928 observations in our analysis sample.
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regression model. The main results indicate that adding elected offices increases taxing at
the low end of the distribution, but increases taxation after a certain point in the data.
That is, the relationship between elected offices and taxing appears to be roughly Ushaped. This is true regardless of how electoral institutions are measured and the result is
robust to a range of alternative specifications. In addition, we find that jurisdictions with
larger average council sizes do tax more than jurisdictions with smaller councils. Each of
these results is explored in greater detail below.
The first and third columns of Table 4 present coefficients for a simple
polynomial equation without controls. The second and fourth columns present the
coefficient estimates with the full controls included. The substantive conclusions are not
sensitive to the inclusion of controls. We therefore focus our discussion on the full
equations. Because the estimated model is a log-log regression, the coefficients represent
elasticities, or the percentage point change in the dependent variable of interest produced
by a percentage point change in the independent variable of interest. Note that in each of
the models, the coefficient on elected offices is negative. And the coefficient on the
squared variable is positive and statistically significant in all the models as well.25
First consider the model using offices per government. Both the linear and
squared version of the variable are statistically significant (p<0.05). The main variable
has a negative effect, while the squared term has a positive effect. The range of the main
explanatory variable (log of elected offices per 10 general purpose governments) has a

25

Including a squared version of another exogenous variable in the regression generates significant
colinearity. The simple correlations are approximately 0.97. This does not produce biased coefficient
estimates; however, it does affect the standard errors of the coefficients. To address this issue, we have
mean deviated the explanatory variable of interest before squaring. In models not shown, this linear
transformation produces identical coefficients, but reduces colinearity significantly. The relevant
coefficient standard errors fall substantially, and therefore the relevant t-values increase as well.
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range of 1.82 to 5.5 in the data. The observed turning point is at 3.2, approximately the
40th percentile of the data. This corresponds to a turning point of approximately 2.6
offices per government; a value for which about 1750 counties have a higher value. That
is, forty percent of the counties in the sample have fewer elected offices per government
than the turning point. Adding elected offices to these counties would reduce, rather than
increase, overall revenue raising. For sixty percent of the counties, however, adding
elected offices would actually increase spending.
The estimates from the per capita measures support similar conclusions,26 and if
anything are stronger. Whereas the t statistic values for the coefficients on the offices per
government measures are between two and three, the t statistics on the offices per capita
measures are both greater than five. Again, the coefficient on the offices per capita
measure is negative, and the coefficient on the squared term is positive. The range of log
of offices per million capita is 2.75 to 9.8 and the estimated turning point is at 5.46,
approximately the 20th percentile. In untransformed terms, the turning point is at 0.24
offices per 1000 capita (corresponding to the same 20th percentile of the data). In sum,
the polynomial regression models of own source revenues support the hypothesis of a Ushaped relationship between elected officials and taxing.
To get a better sense of the magnitude of these effects, we estimate the difference
in predicted mean revenues, setting continuous covariates to their means, dummy
variables to their modes, and allowing the measures of electoral density to vary. Table 5

26

Both the offices per capita and offices per government variables contain values less than one;. When
these negative values are squared the ordering of the underlying data is not maintained because both
negative and positive numbers are treated identically after transformation. To preserve the original
ordering, we simply express the first variable as offices per one million capita and the second as offices per
10 governments. The addition of a constant produces identical coefficient estimates on the untransformed
term, but avoids changing the ordering of the original data.
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lists predicted means at various points in the distribution of elected officials,27 and lists
the marginal effect of adding elected officials to the jurisdiction. The left hand side of
Table 5 summarizes the effect of elected officials using the per government measure; the
right hand side summarizes the effects of elected officials per capita. The first difference
columns indicate the difference in per capita revenues raised shifting from the row i in
the table to row i+1. To illustrate, the value corresponding to the fifth percentile of the
number of elected offices per government is 2.42, which produces a predicted level of per
capita revenues of approximately $952. The value of the elected offices per government
variable at the tenth percentile is 2.64, which produces a predicted mean level of per
capita revenues of $846. Moving from the fifth percentile to the tenth percentile,
therefore produces a net decrease in own source revenues of approximately $106. Again,
the estimated turning point in the polynomial regression model is at approximately 3.27,
which is at the 40th percentile. At this point in the distribution of elected offices per
government, the predicted mean of own source revenues is $838. Shifts at or around the
40th percentile of the data produce virtually no changes in revenues. The results are
essentially identical for the per capita measure of elected offices. Moving along the
distribution produces decreases in spending until around the thirtieth percentile of the
data, at which point more elected offices produce increases in spending. Shifting from the
50th percentile to the 90th percentile produces an increase in revenues raised of
approximately $125 per capita.
Our theory suggests that costs of monitoring additional elected offices may at
some point offset the benefits of issue unbundling, leading to a roughly U-shaped

27

The values of the distribution points are summaries of the log of elected offices per ten general purpose
governments and the log of elected offices per million people respectively.
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relationship with spending. But we have no particular reason to expect that this
relationship is quadratic per se. Therefore, to test the sensitivity of our results to
functional form assumptions, we next estimate the effects of elected offices semiparametrically. Specifically, we use a generalized additive model (GAM), in which we
estimate the effect of elected offices with thin plate regression splines and allow all of the
other covariates to enter the model linearly.
The results are graphically summarized in Figure 1. The graphs represent the
relationship between the measures of electoral density (log of elected offices per 1000
capita) and general own-source revenue per capita.28 Solid lines represent point estimates;
dashed lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. In each of the graphs, the curve is
downward sloping and turns upward at a point well within the data. The U-shape is
clearly evident in the estimated effects of elected offices per capita. Put simply, the
results from the GAM model lend further support to the conclusions of the simple
polynomial regression model. The relationship between electoral institutions and fiscal
policy is not linear; rather, increasing the number of elected officials reduces revenueraising in counties with few elected officials, but increases spending in counties with
many elected officials. Based on these results, we conclude that the quadratic fit in the
linear models achieves a satisfactory approximation to the underlying relationship
between electoral density and own-source revenue.
Returning to Table 1, our other main result is that the coefficient on the average
council size is also positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). That is, as the average
size of legislative bodies in a county increases, so too does spending. In all the models,
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The results are similar for both the per capita and per government measures. We therefore only present
the per capita figures herein.
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the coefficient hovers at approximately 0.10. A percentage point increase in the average
size of the governing body produces roughly a one-tenth percentage point increase in
revenue raised from own sources. This result is consistent with prior findings from Baqir
(2002), who finds an elasticity of 0.11 in a comparable model. When we experiment with
adding a quadratic term for council size (not shown), it is never significant in any of the
models. Putting the results together, the data show that increasing the size of legislative
bodies increases taxing, but that adding other nonlegislative body elected officials can
reduce or can increase taxing, depending on how many elected officials are already
present in the jurisdiction. These findings are consistently with the law of 1/n, as well as
our theory of unbundling and monitoring costs.
The other control variables are fairly standard in the literature. However, a few
coefficients are noteworthy. First, income is an important determinant of own-source
revenue, and the elasticity is greater than one, as predicted by Wagner’s Law (b=1.3 in
the equation including elected offices per government and b=1.4 in the equation
including elected offices per capita). In addition, the degree of ethnic fractionalization is
positive and statistically significant, while the ratio of mean to median income, a rough
measure of the degree of economic heterogeneity in the jurisdiction, shows a significant
negative relationship with own-source revenue. These estimates are consistent with prior
work (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999).
Counties with more children proportionally raise slightly more own source
revenues than counties with fewer children proportionally. So too counties with a higher
proportion of college graduates. In addition, suburban counties spend significantly less
then central or rural counties, which could reflect sorting by preferences or greater
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interjurisdictional competition (Schneider, 1988). We also find a quadratic relationship
between county population and own-source revenue, consistent with Baqir (2002).
Population growth is negatively associated with own-source revenue, which may suggest
that it takes time for spending to catch up with population in rapidly growing areas.
The coefficients on Federal Intergovernmental Revenue per capita and State
Intergovernmental Revenue per capita are positive and statistically significant in both
models. Counties with governments that receive more intergovernmental revenue per
capita also raise more per capita from own source revenues, consistent with the “flypaper
effect” (e.g., Hines and Thaler, 1995).29 Lastly, note that in both sets of equations,
partisanship appears to matter relatively little. The proportion of the county that voted for
the Republican presidential candidate in 1992 produces virtually no change in the level of
own source revenue per capita. All of these findings are, of course, of secondary interest
to our work. However, the findings are largely consistent with the existing literature.
Using either method of standardizing elected offices, the same central results
hold. The relationship between elected nonlegislative offices and taxation is roughly
summarized by a U shape. At the same time, making legislative councils larger increases
taxation. The results provide support for the law of 1/n, as well as the unbundling and
monitoring costs theory.

B. Electoral Institutions and Expenditures
To this point, we have focused predominantly on revenue raising or taxation,
asking how electoral institutions affect the generation of revenue in local government.
29

One concern with these results is that intergovernmental revenue may be jointly determined with ownsource revenue. In results not show, we reestimated all the models in the paper excluding the
intergovernmental revenue variables. The results for electoral density did not change notably.
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Taxing, however, is only half the story. If governments with more elected officials tax
differently, they should also spend differently. In this section, we analyze the relationship
between electoral institutions and expenditures by local government. Our main results
regarding expenditures provide further support for the findings on electoral density and
revenue raising. Areas with more elected offices spend less up to a point, beyond which
adding elected officials produces more spending. However, the size of the legislative
body is not statistically significant in the spending models, although it retains a positive
coefficient. This same basic pattern of results is replicated not just at the level of overall
expenditures, but also on a majority of tested line-item expenditures as well.
1. Aggregate Expenditures
To ascertain whether local government spending varies as a function of electoral
institutions, we replicate the earlier analysis of own source revenues, replacing the
dependent variable with a measure of overall spending by all units of government within
each county. The results are presented in Table 6. The independent variables of interest
are logged versions of the number of elected offices, both normalized by the number of
governments and citizens. Overall government spending is calculated per capita and
logged in all models.
As above, the same substantive conclusions are supported by the simple equation
and models with full controls. Once again, we focus our discussion the full control
estimates (columns (2) and (4) in Table 6). To start with, the estimated effect of both
offices per government and offices per capita appears to be U-shaped as indicated by the
results from the polynomial regression model. The coefficients on elected offices per
government and elected offices per capita are negative and the coefficients on the squared
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versions of those variables are positive; all are statistically significant at conventional
levels.
Figure 2 contains the GAM estimates with expenditures replacing revenue raising
as the dependent variable. Again, the semi-parametric methods provide further support
for the polynomial regression models, as the figure exhibits an obvious U-shaped
relationship. Together, the polynomial regression estimates and the GAM estimates
provide strong evidence that the relationship between the number of elected offices and
fiscal behavior is U-shaped.
The results from our analysis of expenditures diverge from the analysis of
revenues in one key sense. In the models of expenditures, the effect of average council
size is positive (as before), but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Thus, the council size result appears sensitive to the choice of dependent variable. We
will have more to say about this issue in section II.D.

2. Functional Expenditures
If the above results are correct, then a natural next stage of analysis is ask whether
the results on aggregate expenditures apply to specific categories of spending. To explore
this question, we estimate a series of models regressing the amount of money spent in
specific functional categories on electoral institutions and controls. To conserve space,
we report only the coefficients for elected offices per government.30 The results presented
in Table 7 correspond to the coefficient on elected offices per government in the model of

30

Complete results are available from the authors on request.
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the listed spending variable, including all the control variables used above.31 In essence,
we use expenditures on specific budget items as a further check on the validity of our
earlier findings.
First, note that the budget lines include all detailed spending categories contained
in the Census of Governments, which covers a diverse range of policies including
hospitals, education, sewers, and interest on debt. Second, note that ten spending
categories show the predicted quadratic relationship with offices per government and at a
statistically significant level. Another 16 categories demonstrate the predicted
relationship—negative effect for the electoral density and positive for its quadratic—
although the relationships fall short of statistical significance. Indeed only 8 of the 35
spending categories show a relationship with offices per government that is not of the
predicted shape, and none of these is statistically significant at conventional levels. In
other words, all coefficients that are statistically significant are negative on offices per
government and positive on its square. We do not want to make too much of these
findings. However, the disaggregation suggests that the U-shaped relationship between
elected officials and expenditures is present for many, though certainly not all, individual
spending line items as well as for total spending.

C. Debt
The analysis of taxing, general spending, and functional spending all suggest a Ushaped relationship between electoral density and fiscal behavior in local government.
However, own source revenue and aggregate expenditures are closely related. Aggregate
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We take the natural log of elected offices per government but leave the dependent spending variables
untransformed in the models. As a consequence, effects are changes in the actual level of dollars spent.
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local expenditures are the sum of own source revenues, intergovernmental transfers, and
debt. Does the presence of more elected officials generate a similar effect on the use debt
in local governments? The answer to this question is yes though with a few caveats.
To test this hypothesis, we ran a series of models of long-term debt outstanding
per capita against our measures of electoral density. Table 8 presents the results of both
simple regressions and models with full controls. In large part, the results mirror those of
the earlier sections. As columns two and four indicate, in the full equations, the
coefficients on elected offices per government and per capita are positive and statistically
significant; the coefficient on square of those variables is positive and statistically
significant. So too in the simple model for elected offices per government. The caveat is
that in the simple model of elected offices per capita, the coefficient on the square is
negative, though small. In that equation, there is not turning in the data after which the
effect of electoral density is positive. Given the robustness of the findings across all our
other models, we are not particularly troubled by this one model. Nonetheless, we report
the result for the sake of transparency. The turning points in the two full equations are at
approximately the 89th (offices per government) and 82d (offices per capita) percentiles
respectively.

D. First-Differences Analysis
The results presented thus far are based on cross-sectional county aggregate data
for 1992. We have argued that electoral institutions can be considered predetermined in
the short run, thus mitigating some of the usual concerns with cross-sectional analysis.
Nevertheless, in this section we test the robustness of our results by estimating the main
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findings in first-differences. Differencing the data strips away the effects of any
observable or unobservable variables that do not change over time. Thus, this strategy
addresses any lingering concerns about omitted variables that may influence both
electoral institutions and fiscal outcomes.
Data on elected offices in local governments are available in electronic form from
the COG for 1987 and 1992. We merge these two years of data to create a short panel of
county aggregate data. Consistent with our argument that electoral institutions do not
change quickly, we note that we do not have a great deal of between-year variation in our
measures of electoral density. The correlation between elected offices per government in
1987 and 1992 is 0.97; for elected offices per capita it is 0.96. The lack of cross-year
variation should, if anything, bias against finding effects of electoral density in firstdifferences models. Because most of our demographic variables are from the 1990
Census, we are not able to include them in the first-difference models; we do not have
independent values for 1992 and 1987. However, the effects of these and other variables
that do not change significantly over the 5 year period will be washed out in the first
differencing. We do include as predictors a smaller set of variables for which we are able
to measure changes between 1987 and 1992. These include average council size,
population and its square, and the number of governments of different types in the
county. In addition, we include a functional performance index (FPI), which sums
nationwide median spending for each service provided in the county.32 The FPI should
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The FPI is defined as follows. For each functional spending category in the COG, we create a 0/1
variable for each county indicating whether the county has positive spending for that function. Next we
compute median spending on each function among those counties in which the function is provided. For
each county, we then sum nationwide median spending on each function it provides. This summary index
indicates the amount a county would spend if it spent the nationwide median amount on each service it
provides. Formally, the index is defined as:
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capture changes in spending over time that are associated with changes in functional
performance.
Table 9 presents results of the first-differences models,33 in which we regress
changes in own-source revenue between 1987 and 1992 on changes in the independent
variables. The results for both the per capita and per government measures of electoral
density are consistent with our cross-sectional models. In all specifications, we find a
statistically significant quadratic relationship between electoral density and own-source
revenues. We can, therefore, be reasonably confident that the cross-sectional results
presented above are not being driven by omitted variable bias.
Interestingly, however, the results for council size change notably in the firstdifferences model. There is a significant negative effect of average council size in both
models, which is at odds with the positive coefficient from the cross-sectional models. In
models not shown, we also find the positive council size effect when we exclude the
other independent variables. The most natural interpretation of these results is that the
positive council size effects in the cross-sectional analyses are due to omitted variable
bias. As council size is not our main variable of interest, we do not pursue the issue
further here.

VI. DISCUSSION

FPI j = ∑iα ij μi ,
where i indexes functional spending categories and j indexes counties; αij is one if county j provides service
i and zero if it does not, and μi represents nationwide median spending on service i among all counties that
provide the service. Thus, a county’s FPI will increase whenever it adds a new service and whenever
nationwide median spending on its existing services increases. This is a variation on the method of Clark
and Fergusson (1976).
33
Because we have only two time periods, fixed effects and first-differences models produce identical
results.
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The theoretical and empirical literature in economics and political science
contains divergent predictions about the relationship between electoral institutions and
the fiscal behavior of governments. One collection of scholarship predicts that overspending bias will increase with the number of elected officials. Another predicts
increasing the number of elected offices improves the ability of voters to manage the
principal-agent problem of representation. A third predicts that policy outcomes will be
largely invariant to the number or nature of electoral institutions.
Against this backdrop, we have sought to make two theoretical contributions.
First, we have emphasized that all elected officials are not identical. Adding elected
officials serving in districted general purpose legislative bodies may well produce
increases in spending and greater slack between voters and politicians. However, when
new elected offices generate unbundling, this should increase voter control over
politicians. The precise form of electoral institutions matters. Second, while we find
nascent work on unbundling to be extremely promising, we also suggest that it is
incomplete in its current form. Unbundling should help manage agency problems, but it
will often also produce new monitoring costs. A theory of electoral institutions must
account for both.
Our main empirical contribution has been to offer evidence of a U-shaped
relationship between elected offices in local government and patterns of government
taxing and spending. An important, if secondary, empirical contribution is to demonstrate
that the relationship between council size and spending is sensitive to the inclusion of
unit-level fixed effects, although more work is clearly warranted to explain why. In any
case, we find little evidence that electoral institutions are irrelevant to the fiscal behavior

35

Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
of local government. Our analysis then, supports the basic idea that elections matter, but
adds significant nuance to this claim.
If our theoretical apparatus is correct, it suggests a number of potential future
research questions. Perhaps most importantly, we have treated institutional variation as
exogenous for purposes of our analysis, but it is clear that institutional choices—perhaps
made long ago—shape the local political and fiscal landscape in important ways.
Investigating the sources of these institutional choices is at the top of our future research
agenda.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis links several strains of literature in economics, law, and political
science on the relationship between political institutions and policy outcomes. Our central
finding is that differences in the number of elected officials in local government produce
significant differences in level of taxing and spending. With respect to nonlegislative
body elected officials, adding officials to jurisdictions with few existing officials
produces spending and taxing decreases. Adding officials to jurisdictions with lots of
elected officials actually increases taxing and spending. This manifests empirically as Ushaped relationship between the number of elected officials and fiscal behavior.
With respect to theoretical models of politics, our findings suggest the importance
of better theorizing not just about elections writ-large, but also with respect to how
variation in local political and institutional arrangements might facilitate or undermine
the use of elections to control legislators. In this sense, our work fits into a long-standing
tradition of scholarship that uses economic, demographic, and political characteristics to
explore taxing and spending patterns by state and local government. However, by relying
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on county-level data, and the nonlinear functional form, we are able to provide a novel
perspective on politics, institutional structure, and public finance.
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Table 1. Elected Officials and Governments in the United States

542

Members of
governing
boards
540

Other elected
boards
-

Other elected
officials
2

Number of
governments
1

18,828

7,461

1,331

10,036

50

All local governments

493,830

342,812

40,922

110,096

85,955

General Purpose
County

58,818

17,274

10,835

30,709

3,043

135,531
126,958

107,542
51,770

4,157
25,930

23,832
49,258

19,279
16,656

88,434
84,089

83,596
82,630

-

4,838
1,459

14,422
31,555

513,200

350,813

42,253

120,134

86,006

Total
Federal Government
State Governments

Subcounty
Municipal
Town or township
Special Purpose
School districts
Special districts
TOTAL

Source: Census of Governments, 1992, Vol. 1, No. 2, "Popularly Elected Officials"

Table 2. Non-Governing Body Elected Officials
Elected Office
County Executive
Mayor
Assessor
Attorney
Auditor
County Clerk
Clerk
Clerk of the Court
Constable
Justice of the Peace
County or Probate Judge
Municipal Judge
Coroner
Sheriff
Police Chief
Recorder
Collector
Treasurer
Road or Highway Commissioner
Superintendent of Schools
Surveyor
Other Miscellaneous

County officials
324
1,703
1,842
815
1,648
1,812
3,100
2,862
1,901
1,466
2,930
1,040
295
2,126
460
562
5,716

Municipal
officials
11,380
636
425
1,367
3,735
138
176
482
1,360
649
351
4
2,221
120
470

Township
officials
119
4,907
67
4,998
7
12,046
35
2,830
3,161
201
52
29
55
8,054
2,423
1
10,184

Source: Census of Governments, 1992, Vol. 1, No. 2, "Popularly Elected Officials"

Total elected
officials
324
11,499
7,246
2,334
7,180
1,655
15,781
1,985
6,106
6,505
1,901
1,561
1,466
2,930
701
1,420
354
12,401
2,543
461
562
16,370

Counties where
present
317
2,699
1,997
2,018
853
1,649
1,334
1,807
904
826
1,177
569
1,386
2,930
358
1,181
326
2,289
271
459
562
1,691

Table 3. Aggregate County-Area Elected Offices
25th
Average Minumum percentile

Median

75th
percentile Maximum Minimum County

Elected Offices
Total
26.3
0
9
13
33
Per 1,000 capita
1.7
0
0.3
0.7
1.6
Per government
4.4
0
2
3
5.4
*Not a unique minimum. Six counties have zero non-governing body elected officials.
Source: Census of Governments, 1992, Vol. 1, No. 2, "Popularly Elected Officials"

370 Maui, HI*
74.7 Maui, HI*
90 Maui, HI*

Maximum County
Cook, IL
Slope, ND
Rutland, VT

Table 3A. Summary Statistics

Mean
Std. Dev.
Min.
25th pctile Median 75th pctile
Variable
Source
ln(own-source revenue per capita)
COG
6.87
0.56
4.58
6.54
6.91
7.22
ln(direct general expenditures per capita)
COG
7.47
0.37
5.11
7.22
7.45
7.71
ln(long-term debt outstanding per capita)
COG
6.20
1.42
0.00
5.64
6.36
7.01
ln(elected offices per government)
COG
3.50
0.74
1.27
3.00
3.40
4.01
ln(elected offices per 1 million capita)
COG
6.53
1.43
0.25
5.72
6.63
7.41
ln(average council size)
COG
1.62
0.36
0.08
1.43
1.61
1.73
ln(population)
CPH
10.13
1.37
4.67
9.25
10.01
10.92
ethnic fractionalization index
CPH
0.20
0.18
0.00
0.04
0.13
0.35
mean to median income ratio
CPH
1.27
0.10
1.02
1.20
1.25
1.32
percent population 65 and over
CPH
15.01
4.33
1.40
12.20
14.60
17.50
ln(income per capita)
CPH
2.38
0.22
1.42
2.25
2.36
2.49
percent families with children
CPH
48.04
4.91
25.10
45.30
47.90
50.70
percent adults with college degree or higher
CPH
13.34
6.32
3.70
9.20
11.70
15.40
dummy = 1 if central county of MSA
CPH
0.16
0.37
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
dummy = 1 if suburban county
CPH
0.10
0.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
ln(land area)
CPH
6.54
0.74
3.85
6.10
6.45
6.84
federal intergovernmental revenue per capita, $1000s COG
0.05
0.08
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.06
state intergovernmental revenue per capita, $1000s
COG
0.73
0.31
0.00
0.54
0.67
0.84
Republican vote share in 1992 presidential election
CCD
39.60
8.51
12.90
33.80
39.00
45.10
percent population growth, 1980-1992
CCD
5.97
20.25
-34.40
-6.30
2.50
12.70
ln(number of municipalities)
COG
1.75
0.69
0.00
1.39
1.79
2.20
ln(number of townships)
COG
0.90
1.34
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.48
ln(number of special districts)
COG
1.99
0.90
0.00
1.39
1.95
2.56
ln(number of school districts)
COG
1.41
0.80
0.00
0.69
1.39
1.95
Notes: COG = 1992 Census of Governments; CPH = 1990 Census of Population and Housing; CCD = 1994 City and County Data Book.
The unit of observation is the county area.
N = 2965 for all variables except offices per government, for which N = 2928, as explained in the text.

Max.
9.72
9.18
11.32
6.80
11.22
4.80
16.00
0.67
2.01
34.00
3.35
79.60
53.40
1.00
1.00
9.91
1.03
3.48
75.00
207.70
4.80
4.28
6.14
5.03

Table 4. Polynomial Regression Models of Own Source Revenue
ln(offices per government)
ln(offices per government)2
ln(offices per capita)

(1)
-0.286
(0.095)***
0.033
(0.013)**

(2)
-0.149
(0.083)*
0.023
(0.011)**

(3)

-0.445
(0.041)***
0.033
(0.003)***

(4)

-0.198
(0.051)***
ln(offices per capita)2
0.018
(0.003)***
ln(avg. council size)
0.096
0.101
(0.045)**
(0.043)**
ln(income per capita)
1.336
1.386
(0.081)***
(0.079)***
ln(population)
-0.349
-0.220
(0.070)***
(0.097)**
ln(population)2
0.015
0.009
(0.003)***
(0.004)*
ethnic fractionalization
0.228
0.219
(0.080)***
(0.079)***
Income ratio
-0.379
-0.329
(0.131)***
(0.127)***
Pct pop 65+
0.026
0.020
(0.005)***
(0.005)***
Pct kids
0.019
0.018
(0.004)***
(0.004)***
Pct BA
0.008
0.006
(0.002)***
(0.002)***
Central County
-0.071
-0.071
(0.034)**
(0.034)**
Suburban County
-0.137
-0.141
(0.026)***
(0.026)***
ln(land area)
0.094
0.106
(0.018)***
(0.018)***
Federal revenue
0.418
0.421
(0.119)***
(0.115)***
State revenue
0.128
0.094
(0.047)***
(0.046)**
Republican presidential vote
-0.001
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
population change 1980-1992
-0.003
-0.003
(0.001)***
(0.001)***
ln(municipalities)
-0.042
-0.062
(0.025)*
(0.022)***
ln(townships)
-0.010
-0.038
(0.018)
(0.022)*
ln(special districts)
0.068
0.076
(0.016)***
(0.016)***
ln(school districts)
-0.056
-0.033
(0.021)***
(0.022)
Adj R-squared
0.01
0.25
0.05
0.27
N
2928
2928
2965
2965
Number of counties above turning point
401
1753
1322
2368
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Electoral density is measured as ln(offices per 10 general
purpose governments) and as ln(offices per 1 million capita). The dependent variables is ln(ownsource revenue per capita). All other variables are defined as shown in Table 3A.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

T able 5. P redic ted O wn‐S ourc e R evenues at Different Values of E lec toral Dens ity

P ercentile
1
5
10
25
50
75
90
95
99

P ercentile
1
5
10
25
50
75
90
95
99

ln(offices per 10
governments )
1.83
2.42
2.64
3.00
3.40
4.01
4.50
4.70
5.44

O ffic es per G overnment
O ffices per
P redicted
government
R evenue
0.63
878.65
1.12
952.26
1.40
846.04
2.00
839.90
3.00
838.85
5.50
849.03
9.00
868.01
11.00
878.64
23.00
933.43

ln(offices per 1
million capita)
2.76
3.94
4.64
5.72
6.63
7.41
8.27
8.82
9.77

O ffic es per C apita
O ffices per
P redicted
1000 capita
R evenue
0.02
917.56
0.05
838.60
0.10
814.26
0.31
805.44
0.76
824.73
1.66
861.98
3.92
928.29
6.79
987.02
17.47
1125.47

F irs t
D ifference

S econd
D ifference

73.61
‐106.21
‐6.14
‐1.05
10.18
18.98
10.63
54.79

‐32.61
‐112.36
‐7.20
9.13
29.17
29.61
65.42

F irs t
D ifference

S econd
D ifference

‐78.95
‐24.35
‐8.82
19.30
37.24
66.31
58.73
138.45

‐103.30
‐33.16
10.48
56.54
103.56
125.04
197.18

This table presents predicted values of own-source revenue for different values of electoral
density based on the coefficients from Table 4. The first column denotes various points in the
empirical distribution of electoral density. The second column shows the corresponding value of
electoral density in the natural log form used in the regression models. The third column
translates the value of electoral density into its original form for easier interpretation. The fourth
column shows predicted mean spending at each percentile in the electoral density distribution.
The final two columns present marginal shifts in revenue, equivalently, the difference between the
given and immediately prior listed percentile (or two prior listed percentiles) of electoral density.
For computing the predicted values, all covariates are set at means except dummy variables
which are set to their mode.

Table 6. Polynomial Regression Models of Local Government Expenditures
ln(offices per govt)
ln(offices per govt)2
ln(offices per capita)

(1)
-0.109
(0.054)**
0.015
(0.008)*

(2)
-0.127
(0.048)***
0.016
(0.007)**

(3)

-0.240
(0.025)***
0.020
(0.002)***

(4)

-0.146
(0.033)***
ln(offices per capita)2
0.011
(0.002)***
ln(avg. council size)
0.040
0.041
(0.029)
(0.028)
ln(income per capita)
0.695
0.709
(0.053)***
(0.052)***
ln(population)
-0.277
-0.235
(0.053)***
(0.077)***
ln(offices per capita)2
0.011
0.008
(0.002)***
(0.004)**
ethnic fractionalization
0.141
0.141
(0.049)***
(0.048)***
Income ratio
-0.098
-0.081
(0.095)
(0.091)
Pct pop 65+
0.015
0.013
(0.003)***
(0.003)***
Pct kids
0.015
0.015
(0.003)***
(0.003)***
Pct BA
0.005
0.004
(0.001)***
(0.001)***
Central County
-0.038
-0.039
(0.024)
(0.024)
Suburban County
-0.090
-0.093
(0.016)***
(0.016)***
ln(land area)
0.048
0.057
(0.012)***
(0.011)***
Federal revenue
0.662
0.640
(0.067)***
(0.065)***
State revenue
0.435
0.403
(0.035)***
(0.034)***
Republican presidential vote
-0.001
-0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
population change 1980-1992
-0.002
-0.001
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
ln(municipalities)
-0.042
-0.025
(0.015)***
(0.014)*
ln(townships)
-0.006
-0.015
(0.012)
(0.013)
ln(special districts)
0.036
0.042
(0.010)***
(0.010)***
ln(school districts)
0.008
0.020
(0.014)
(0.014)
Adj R-squared
0.00
0.28
0.04
0.30
N
2928
2928
2965
2965
Counties above turning point
1039
764
2035
1295
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Electoral density is measured as ln(offices per 10 general
purpose governments) and as ln(offices per 1 million capita). The dependent variables is ln(ownsource revenue per capita). All other variables are defined as shown in Table 3A.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7. Effect of Electoral Density on Budget Line Items
Spending Function

Air transportation
Misc commercial activities
Corrections
Elementary & secondary education
Higher education
Financial administration
Fire protection
Judicial
Central staff
Public buildings
Health
Own hospitals
Other hospitals
Regular highways
Toll highways
Public transit
Housing and community development
Libraries
Natural resources
Parking
Parks and recreation
Police
Protective inspection
Welfare, categorical assistance
Welfare, cash assistance
Welfare, medical payments
Welfare, vendor payments
Welfare, insurance
Welfare, other
Sewerage
Solid waste management
Water transit
Interest on general debt
Other expenditures

Elected Offices
per government

Elected Offices per
government squared

Coefficient

Std Error

Coefficient

Std Error

R2

‐23.31***
0.156
‐1.595
‐83.23*
‐58.29**
‐8.196
‐5.570
‐5.036**
‐10.59**
‐5.952***
‐12.29
17.61
‐1.417
‐32.10
‐0.0622
0.255
‐8.397
‐1.760
2.086
‐0.271
‐18.58**
‐6.922
‐1.310
1.702
‐0.392
‐0.765
‐0.453
‐0.601*
9.077
9.840
‐16.32**
‐3.870
‐100.7**
‐15.98

(6.90)
(0.22)
(5.48)
(42.5)
(25.7)
(5.58)
(5.06)
(2.41)
(4.54)
(2.27)
(13.1)
(46.4)
(1.06)
(25.8)
(0.084)
(0.17)
(9.51)
(2.15)
(9.23)
(1.00)
(7.80)
(6.82)
(0.83)
(4.29)
(2.18)
(1.35)
(0.74)
(0.34)
(12.7)
(12.8)
(8.18)
(3.04)
(51.3)
(15.3)

2.578***
‐0.0234
‐0.155
6.245
7.701*
1.243**
0.901
1.145***
1.613***
0.967***
1.669
‐1.355
0.147
5.798
0.00860
‐0.0191
0.354
0.217
‐0.682
0.0151
2.831***
1.582*
0.194*
‐0.247
0.149
0.148
0.0428
0.115**
‐0.875
‐0.780
2.164*
0.315
16.90**
2.714

(0.90)
(0.032)
(0.81)
(5.93)
(4.24)
(0.60)
(0.71)
(0.32)
(0.61)
(0.32)
(1.83)
(6.40)
(0.13)
(3.60)
(0.012)
(0.022)
(1.07)
(0.27)
(1.17)
(0.13)
(1.09)
(0.90)
(0.10)
(0.56)
(0.28)
(0.17)
(0.089)
(0.051)
(1.92)
(1.69)
(1.17)
(0.36)
(7.95)
(2.33)

0.13
0.01
0.02
0.34
0.10
0.19
0.36
0.13
0.16
0.09
0.06
0.05
0.02
0.30
0.03
0.02
0.26
0.11
0.04
0.16
0.22
0.23
0.23
0.10
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.12
0.06
0.03
0.03
0.08

Models include all control variables shown in Table 6 (not shown). Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Electoral density is measured as ln(offices per 10 general purpose governments).
Line-item spending is measured in dollars per capita.

Table 8. Polynomial Regression Models of Long Term Debt
ln(offices per govt)
ln(offices per govt)2
ln(offices per capita)

(1)
-1.316
(0.223)***
0.112
(0.031)***

(2)
-0.599
(0.206)***
0.067
(0.027)**

(3)

-0.285
(0.117)**
-0.018
(0.010)*

(4)

-0.372
(0.150)**
ln(offices per capita)2
0.024
(0.011)**
ln(avg. council size)
-0.035
0.026
(0.122)
(0.122)
ln(income per capita)
1.612
1.461
(0.245)***
(0.260)***
ln(population)
1.706
2.051
(0.287)***
(0.349)***
ln(offices per capita)2
-0.063
-0.084
(0.013)***
(0.015)***
ethnic fractionalization
0.142
0.154
(0.247)
(0.248)
Income ratio
-0.302
-0.499
(0.398)
(0.411)
Pct pop 65+
0.055
0.065
(0.016)***
(0.016)***
Pct kids
0.041
0.049
(0.013)***
(0.013)***
Pct BA
0.007
0.012
(0.007)
(0.007)*
Central County
-0.108
-0.110
(0.074)
(0.075)
Suburban County
-0.099
-0.090
(0.064)
(0.065)
ln(land area)
-0.134
-0.124
(0.056)**
(0.056)**
Federal revenue
0.796
0.796
(0.383)**
(0.388)**
State revenue
0.481
0.488
(0.155)***
(0.155)***
Republican presidential vote
-0.007
-0.007
(0.003)**
(0.003)**
population change 1980-1992
0.005
0.005
(0.002)***
(0.002)***
ln(municipalities)
-0.115
0.054
(0.083)
(0.065)
ln(townships)
-0.032
-0.068
(0.070)
(0.070)
ln(special districts)
0.144
0.135
(0.047)***
(0.047)***
ln(school districts)
-0.119
-0.118
(0.065)*
(0.068)*
Adj R-squared
0.04
0.23
0.17
0.24
N
2928
2928
2965
2965
Counties above turning point
10
322
NA
523
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Electoral density is measured as ln(offices per 10 general
purpose governments) and as ln(offices per 1 million capita). The dependent variables is ln(ownsource revenue per capita). All other variables are defined as shown in Table 3A.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 9: First-Differences Estimates, 1987-1992
Dependent Variable: ln(own-source revenue per
capita)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
ln(offices per govt)
-0.256
-0.206
(0.121)**
(0.103)**
ln(offices per govt)2
0.049
0.039
(0.020)**
(0.017)**
ln(offices per capita)
-0.153
-0.162
(0.071)**
(0.077)**
ln(offices per capita)2
0.014
0.017
(0.006)**
(0.007)***
ln(avg. council size)
-0.080
-0.067
(0.024)***
(0.025)***
ln(population)
1.105
1.565
(0.403)***
(0.401)***
ln(population)2
-0.042
-0.061
(0.019)**
(0.019)***
ln(functional performance index)
1.233
1.227
(0.090)***
(0.090)***
ln(municipalities)
0.097
-0.030
(0.109)
(0.092)
ln(townships)
-0.031
-0.055
(0.026)
(0.032)*
ln(special districts)
0.013
0.013
(0.015)
(0.015)
ln(school districts)
0.096
0.098
(0.047)**
(0.046)**
Adj R-squared
0.01
0.14
0.01
0.14
N
2931
2931
2968
2967
All variables are expressed as first-differences between 1987 and 1992. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses. Electoral density is measured as ln(offices per 10 general purpose
governments) and as ln(offices per 1 million capita). All other variables are defined as shown in
Table 3A. * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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